Team:Northeastern Boston/Jurassic Wet Lab
JURASSIC WET LAB
David Urick discusses the emergence of synbio and the corresponding need for increased security enforcement
A scientist creeps through the thick, tropical undergrowth of a remote island. He wipes sweat from his brow as his eyes keenly search for any sign of his prey. His task: recover a genetically engineered specimen that is loose in the jungle and do so before said specimen can eat him.
It’s a scene straight out of the blockbuster Jurassic World, except this scientist is no movie star. He is on the Cayman Islands, tracking the population of Aedes aegypti, a species of mosquito that transmits the deadly Dengue virus. Several weeks prior, a lab-bred population of male mosquitoes were released on the island to compete with the native males for mates. These transgenic insects carry a gene that renders their female offspring flightless—a death sentence for mosquitoes—eventually depleting the population and preventing the spread of Dengue [1].
Not quite Chris Pratt.
However, these mosquitoes are an effective demonstration of where real life science stands in relation to Hollywood. While they lack the jaw-dropping qualities of a reincarnated triceratops, the potential for widespread destruction is all there. If an island can be cleared of a species in a matter of months, it is by no means a stretch to say that a more ambitious project could have dire effects on ecosystems worldwide.
Synthetic biology has opened the doors for a whole new world of innovation and discovery. Microorganisms will soon produce drugs, fuels, materials, and probably everything else. E. coli will fight cholera and fluorescent cats will help cure AIDs [2]. A library of standardized genetic ‘parts’ and enhanced modeling techniques will only serve to accelerate progress. Heck, chickens might even turn into dinosaurs if we’re lucky [3].
Every possibility carries risk, though, and reckless advancement might carry grave consequences, as Jeff Goldblum cautioned way back in 1993. In 2004, DNA from genetically modified corn planted in Mexico was detected in natural the natural population [4]. Like our Dengue-fighting mosquitoes, gene flow from transgenic crops can have unpredictable effects on the ecological landscape. Herbicide resistant plants can confer their immunity to weeds and other species. Long term herbicide usage eventually will lower its effectiveness, as the resistant weeds become dominant over their vulnerable brethren, causing farmers to switch to less environmentally-friendly herbicides, and lowering crop yield as once farmable land is overrun.
Any organism bestowed with a fitness advantage in the laboratory might have a similar effect when introduced into the wild. As more transgenic crops enter commercial use we may witness an increase in invasive species, biodiversity loss, or other unforeseen threats. Though these side effects likely will be too localized to warrant global concern, even marginal influences on an ecosystem can harm the quality of life and economy of the surrounding human population. Further down the road, too, synthetic biology will undoubtedly produce organisms capable of more severe damage that do demand global regulation.
As organizations like iGEM continue to catalog and standardize parts for open access, it will be easier for synthetic biology to be used in criminal and malicious ways. While it may be possible to screen orders for custom genetic strands now, it will not be when the technology for nucleotide synthesis becomes widespread and cheaper. One potential danger is the production of a super pathogen or other bioweapon. Current consensus [5] downplays the feasibility of a terrorist organization or other actor being proficient enough in the lab to reproduce professional experiments. However, difficulty level is unlikely to remain the sole barrier. We can safely assume that any sufficiently funded and knowledgeable organization—terrorist or otherwise—will be able to produce a bioweapon such as smallpox in the near future while facing little to no obstacles, if security measures remain at current levels.
Additionally, synthetic biology is also a huge boon for the narcotics industry. Labs have already devised new pathways in yeast for producing opiates using sugar instead of poppies, traditionally the key ingredient. Drug cartels of the future may be able to string together different biomachines into a veritable heroin factory, like building a meth lab out of LEGO.
For all the unending possibilities synbio brings to the table, current regulations are relatively sparse. United States biosecurity is focused on a predetermined list of toxins and biological agents and legislation addressing genetically engineered organisms is almost non-existent. The USDA, FDA, and EPA are responsible for the policing of specific end products, but do not oversee the processes that produce them. Additionally, the Controlled Substances Act does not prohibit drug-synthesizing microbes.
One hope is that synbio can be self-regulating. The same advances that will expose us to new forms of danger will also allow us to respond to them quickly. The 2014 Ebola outbreak revealed just how spotty our rapid response protocol is, as current methods still took months to produce a viable vaccine. Similar issues exacerbated the H1N1 pandemic just 5 years earlier. Traditional vaccine production has a turnover time of approximately four months. In 2009, Swine Flu took over 150,000 lives as vaccine stockpiles were emptied. Large scale outbreaks or engineered pathogens could easily render us defenseless. Fortunately, more efficient production methods are on the rise. Transgenic plants can form products in a matter of weeks with no drop in quality. Engineered platforms such as microalgae have the potential to perform the lion’s share of the world’s vaccine production. However, it is critical that the development and standardization of these methods begins now.
Altogether, synbio is left unchecked by governmental policy, allowing it to thrive free from federal interference, but also opening the door for misuse and abuse. The field, along with its associated dangers, is still nebulous, yet will quickly permeate many aspects of life. The time is now, though, for us to ask ourselves, “Should we?”