0. Medal Criteria
We think that the following 3 elements of our P&P meet both of the silver and gold medal criteria.
0.1. Design and execution of the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public
as a means to investigate public concerns surrounding GMO.
0.2. Reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits led to addressing social justice.
0.3. Our attractive project improved in accordance with comments from general public,
strengthened the public engagement of a two-way dialogue between our team and
the public
0.1. Design and execution of the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public
as a means to investigate public concerns surrounding GMO.
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By receiving opinions from the public, we integrated, into our project, a prisoner’s dilemma game played by the high school and undergraduate students, who are people outside of iGEM, to investigate the stereotype surrounding genetic modification. Since we received opinions from the public who concerned the sustainability, safety, and security of gene modification, we designed and executed the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public.
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As shown in Fig. 6-1-0-1, in total, we have four types of payoff matrix. In Group 1 and Group 3 there is a dilemma. In Group 2 and Group 4 there is no dilemma. In the payoff matrices associated with the idea of GMO (Group 3 and Group 4), we wrote the sum of the costs and benefits of using GMO, as the profit in each combination of options. If the game in which there is no dilemma (or in other words the Nash equilibrium matches with the Pareto efficiency) (Group 2), is played to simply compete the scores, the combination of options on the bottom right would be rational. We designed this game, so that when we combine this same payoff matrix with the story associated with GMO (Group 4), using GMO will lead to high scores.
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Fig. 6-1-0-1. Our payoff matrix
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Through execution of the games, we found that the public selected the option which seems to be affected by the stereotype: “GMO is dangerous.” When we compared the total number of times the combination of options was selected among the participants in row 1, column 1 between Group 2 and 4’s payoff matrices (Fig.2-1-6-2), the result was 2% in Group 2, in which the idea of GMO was not associated, and 8% in Group 4, in which the idea of GMO was associated. Even though this combination of options (row 1, column 1) is not Pareto efficient, disfavor of GMO may have attracted more selections to this combination of options with less profit. (Further description is written here)). A possible interpretation from this result is that the public’s option selection was affected by concerns for sustainability, safety, and security of genetic modification, which were not shown in the payoff matrix. To precisely examine further on this interpretation, we would like to increase the number of subjects playing the prisoner’s dilemma game.
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Fig. 6-1-0-2. The percentage of the total number of times participants selected each combination of options in each group
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0.2. Reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits led to addressing
social justice.
We realized the importance of reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits, from one of the cases of the prisoner’s dilemma game held among the public. We think that such an original finding is an innovative education to ourselves and meets the criteria of the gold medal.
In the game played among high school students and undergraduate students, who are all people outside of iGEM, we identified an example where the player himself realized the irrationality of selecting the options adhered to the stereotypes of the term GMO, in the middle of the iterated game. Player B in Fig.6-1-0-3, experienced option selection influenced by preconceptions obtained when we first explained the original Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario. From the 4th round of the game, realizing that higher points is needed to win the game, Player B’s option became ‘use.’ So we temporarily thought of asserting that “each individual’s constant thinking of whether the payoff matrix is correct or not, will lead to the increase of the score for the entire society”. However, from our full year experience in iGEM, we realized the necessity of verifying from a different point of view. In other words, we realized that we researchers ourselves must also continuously reflect on the costs, benefits, and risks of the science we discover. In the workshop that we attended as our initial activity in iGEM, we learned from social scientists, the danger of grounding on the deficit model, which fixes on the idea that the general public is ignorant, and the importance of the two-way dialogue between society and researchers. From this past experience, we realized that it wasn’t the participants of the prisoner’s dilemma game who were misinterpreting the payoff matrix from the stereotype of the term GMO, but it might have been the members of iGEM Tokyo Tech who were misinterpreting both the costs and benefits of GMO. The profit of our payoff matrix in the dilemma game was indeed designed from assumptions for both the costs and benefits of GMO. Now we address that in order to understand the correct payoff matrix of technology, instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by researchers, one-sidedly to the general public, the attitude of cooperating and thinking together with the general public, is important in social justice. Through these process written above, we think that we have already met the silver and gold medal criteria, since we have demonstrated an innovative human practice involving public engagement, by establishing a two-way dialogue.
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Fig.6-1-0-3. Results of a dilemma game held in between two students |
0.3. Our attractive project improved in accordance with comments from general public,
strengthened the public engagement of a two-way dialogue between our team and
the public
Comments from the general public, who are beyond the bench, modified the design and execution of our project, which is the E. coli version of the prisoner’s dilemma, and made the project more attractive for the general public. We have thought that the establishment of a two-way dialogue is important for synthetic biology to be understood from general public, and is important to avoid any prejudice against synthetic biology. In a school festival, thus we explained our projects to attract the public’s interest, and successfully received valuable comments for improving our project. The most important comment led to the introduction of random decision making by E. coli itself, since we had originally planned to express choices of options made by humans, in each prisoner coli. Since then, we adopted FimB recombinase for such E. coli decision making. Another integration for the project’s execution to attract public interest, was the introduction of option selecting strategies by the prisoners. We were excited by identifying a famous strategy in the series of games played beyond the bench by the public, and were sure that the introduction of such strategies would make the game more attractive. We thus implemented the tit-for-tat strategy by adopting FimE recombinase into the design of our Decision making coli.
Now we are confident that our E. coli version of the prisoner's dilemma game is important to strengthen a two-way dialogue to a wide range of public. Even if we try to establish a two-way dialogue, the general public’s apathy towards synthetic biology would make it impossible for us to start a two-way dialogue.
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Fig.6-1-0-4. Modifying the design and execution of our project |
1. Introduction
In our process of having high school students and undergraduate students participate in our prisoner’s dilemma game, we realized the importance of reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits.
When we explained about iGEM and about our project in the school festival, we received from the public skeptical opinions surrounding genetic modification. Therefore, we decided to investigate and identify the stereotypes surrounding genetic modification.
2. Dilemma Game
To investigate what kind of stereotypes people in the general public have about genetic modification, we prepared four types of games, Group 1 ~ Group4.
Group 1 is a simple prisoner’s dilemma game where there is a dilemma.
Group 2 also is a simple prisoner’s dilemma game, but there is no dilemma.
Group 3 has the same payoff matrix as Group 1, so there is a dilemma.
Group 4 has the same payoff matrix as Group 2, so there is no dilemma.
For Group 3 and 4, the payoff matrices are associated with the idea of GMO. The combination of options in the payoff matrices consists of the sum of the costs and benefits resulting from using GMO.
We had the participants form a pair of two. Then, we had each pair play one of the four types of games (Group 1 ~ Group 4).
In Group 1 and Group 2 (Fig.6-1-2-1 and Fig.6-1-2-2), after explaining the original Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario, we had the participants repeat the game 10 rounds to compete against each other by aiming for higher scores. ‘C’ stands for cooperation and ‘D’ stands for defection.
In Group 1’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-1), considering the profit of each combination of options, there should be a dilemma between selecting cooperation and selecting defection.
In Group 2’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-2), considering the profit of each combination of options, there should not be a dilemma between selecting cooperation and selecting defection, because rationally thinking, selecting defection would lead to higher scores.
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Fig.6-1-2-1. The payoff matrix of Group 1 | Fig.6-1-2-2. The payoff matrix of group 2 |
In Group 3 and Group 4 (Fig.6-1-2-3 and Fig.6-1-2-4), after explaining the original Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario, we explained the following story before starting the game.
“You two are each the leader of two neighboring countries, A and B. You two must choose between using and not using GMO in your country.” |
We then had the participants repeat the game 10 rounds to compete against each other by aiming for higher scores. ‘not use’ stands for not using GMO and ‘use’ stands for using GMO.
Group 3’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-3) has the same scores as Group 1 (Fig.6-1-2-1).
Group 4’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-4) has the same scores as Group 2 (Fig.6-1-2-2).
In Group 3’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-3), considering the scores of each option, there should be a dilemma between selecting ‘not use’ and selecting ‘use.’
In Group 4’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-4), considering the scores of each option, there should
not be a dilemma between selecting ‘not use’ and selecting ‘use,’ because rationally thinking, selecting ‘use’ would lead to higher scores.
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Fig.6-1-2-3. The payoff matrix of Group 3 | Fig.6-1-2-4. The payoff matrix of Group 4 |
However, in Group 3 and Group 4, we predicted that if there is a stereotype that “GMO is dangerous,” the combination of options on the top left (A: ‘not use,’ B: ‘not use’) will be selected more frequently, compared to Group 1 and Group 2’s combination of options on the top left (A: ‘Cooperation,’ B: ‘Cooperation’).
3. Result 1
 Fig.6-1-3-1. The percentage of the total number of times participants selected each combination of options in each group |
The results of the games are shown above (Fig.6-1-3-1). These percentages express the total number of times each combination of options were selected by all the pairs who played each game.
The results were as expected. Comparing Group 2 and Group 4, Group 4 had a higher percentage of the combination of options on the top left (A: ‘not use,’ B: ‘not use’), than Group 2’s combination of options on the top left (A: ‘Cooperation,’ B: ‘Cooperation’).
4. Conclusion 1
From this result, we could interpret that the public has concerns for sustainability, safety, and security of genetic modification, which were not shown in the payoff matrix.
5. Result 2
Interestingly, we found the example of a player who himself realized the irrationality of selecting the options adhered to the stereotype of the term GMO, in the middle of the iterated game.
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Fig.6-1-5-1. The Result of A Certain of Pair in Group 4 |
Player B, in Fig.6-1-5-1, experienced decision making influenced by preconceptions obtained when we first explained the original Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario. From the 4th round of the game, realizing that higher points is needed to win the game, Player B’s option became ‘use’. From this result, we interpreted that until the 3rd round, Player B, who was influenced by preconceptions of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario, was imagining a payoff matrix like the one in Group 1 (Fig.6-1-3-1) and in Group 3 (Fig.6-1-3-3), where there is a dilemma, and was misled into a dilemma. However, when Player B selected the option ‘use’ in the 4th round, since his score increased more than he expected, he realized that the points were different between the payoff matrix he was imagining in his head, and the payoff matrix in the game he was playing. Since Player B realized that he was misinterpreting the payoff matrix in the first half of the game, the total scores between Player A and Player B did not differ so greatly.
5.1. Modeling
Given Result 2, we simulated how the timing of realizing the fact that “the payoff matrix that one was imagining in his/her mind is wrong,” affects the total score. In this model, we used Group 4’s payoff matrix and made both A and B use the random strategy. However, in A’s mind instead of Group 4’s payoff matrix, he/she is imagining Group 3’s payoff matrix. Since the payoff matrix in his/her mind does not match with the payoff matrix in reality, the increase in score that one is imagining in his mind will also not match with the score in reality. When his/her score goes below a certain number than the opponent’s score, he/she will realize that he/she is misinterpreting the payoff matrix.
We called this certain amount the score gap and simulated 2 types of score gap. In one type we set the score gap to -10, so that one realizes the misinterpretation of the payoff matrix quickly, and in the other type we set the score gap to -50, so that it takes time for one to realize the misinterpretation of the payoff matrix. After simulating the 2 types of score gap 20 times each, since the decisions are made randomly by both players, we obtained various results. The following are a few examples from the results.
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Fig.6-1-5-2. When the score gap between A and B is -10, Player A realized that he was misinterpreting the payoff matrix |
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Fig.6-1-5-3. When the score gap between A and B is -10, Player A did not realize that he was misinterpreting the payoff matrix |
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Fig.6-1-5-4. When the score gap between A and B is -50, Player A realized that he was misinterpreting the payoff matrix |
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Fig.6-1-5-5. When the score gap between A and B is -50, Player A did not realize that he was misinterpreting the payoff matrix |
6. Conclusion 2
From the results of the modeling, we found out that faster realization of the misunderstanding of the payoff matrix, leads to higher total scores. Therefore, we temporarily thought of asserting that “each individual’s constant thinking of whether the payoff matrix is correct or not, will lead to the increase of the score for the entire society.”
However, from our full year experience in iGEM, we realized the necessity of verifying from a different perspective. In other words, we realized that we researchers ourselves must also continuously reflect on the costs, benefits, and risks of the science we discover. In the workshop that we attended as our initial activity in iGEM, we learned from social scientists, the danger of grounding on the deficit model, which fixes on the idea that the general public is ignorant, and the importance of the two-way dialogue between society and researchers. From this past experience, we realized that it wasn’t the participants of the dilemma game who were misinterpreting the payoff matrix from the stereotype of the term GMO, but it might have been the members of iGEM Tokyo Tech who were misinterpreting both the costs and benefits of GMO. The scores of our payoff matrix in the dilemma game was indeed designed from assumptions of both the costs and benefits of GMO. Now we address that in order to understand the correct payoff matrix of technology, instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by specialists, one-sidedly to the general public, the posture of cooperating and thinking together with the general public, is important in social justice.
7. Consideration
From our Policy & Practices, we realized the importance of reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits, or in other words the payoff matrix, from the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the high school and undergraduate students. Instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by researchers, one-sidedly to the general public, we have established a two-way dialogue by cooperating and thinking together with the general public.
Our team, Tokyo Tech have considered that the payoff matrix of Group 4 was most based on reality from the point of view that GMO is not dangerous. Therefore, in the case like Conclusion 2, we defined Group 4 as the real payoff matrix, and interpreted that Group 3 is the payoff matrix one is misinterpreting in his head. However, there is a possibility that this interpretation of ours is wrong.
No one can know the correct figure of the payoff matrix that is closest to reality. We as researchers, instead of fixing upon the payoff matrix that already exists, must evaluate the costs, risks and benefits by attempting in a small range where the damage can be limited, and pursue the correct figure of the payoff matrix, when an unpredictable accident happens. We researchers must continuously keep reflecting on the payoff matrix, and pursue the one closest to reality. Instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by specialists, one-sidedly to the general public, the posture of cooperating and thinking together with the general public, is important in social justice. Each individual’s attempt to pursue his/her own payoff matrix is most important.
8.Other Activity
We learned from social scientists, the danger of grounding on the deficit model, which fixes on the idea that the general public is ignorant, and the importance of the two-way dialogue between society and researchers, by participating in the lecture of the theme called “Synthetic Biology and the Society” held on November ○, 2014.
In the conventional way of thinking, activities to enhance understanding was done by providing scientific knowledge from the experts, who are one step ahead, to the general public, who are yet ignorant.
Therefore since experts tend to interpret the general public’s concerns and lack of understanding only as “lack of knowledge,” they fixed on the idea that GMO
Therefore experts thought that the general public can understand the scientific knowledge and can accept GMO, consequently if experts educate the scientific knowledge more to the general public.
However, in reality, there are elements from a whole different dimension, such as the skepticism towards social fairness and the collapse of belief, involved in the background of people feeling insecurity and hesitation towards the acceptance of scientific technology.
The general public has the “knowledge,” which is different from the narrow definition of scientific knowledge that experts think.
Therefore the establishment of a two-way dialogue between the experts and the general public, and the “scientific technological communication,” in which the conversation at the same point of view is pursued, is regarded recently.
Even if researchers think it is “for society” based on his/her own interest or on his/her own judgment, and research and develop, it may not be received in the same way by the real society.
We felt the necessity of the learning between experts and non-experts in a two-way dialogue.
From this lecture and the prisoner’s dilemma game played among the public, our team wants to assert that we experts must reflect on ourselves, and that the posture of cooperating and thinking together with the general public, is important in social justice.
When we first played the prisoner’s dilemma game, we interpreted the results from the game, that the “from the repeated game, the player himself realized the irrationality of choosing the options adhered to the stereotype of the term GMO.”
However, by looking back on the lecture of “Synthetic Biology and the Society,” we felt the necessity to verifying our own interpretation from a different perspective.
It wasn’t the participants of the dilemma game who were misinterpreting the payoff matrix from the stereotype of the term GMO, but it might have been the members of iGEM Tokyo Tech who were misinterpreting both the costs and benefits of GMO.
What is needed by society,
to continuously think about what is needed by society, or about if our own conception is biased or not, we instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by specialists, one-sidedly to the general public, must establish a two-way dialogue.
