Difference between revisions of "Team:Tokyo Tech/Project"
| Line 43: | Line 43: | ||
<h3 class="link3"><a href="#513">5.1.3 Always defect strategy</a></h3> | <h3 class="link3"><a href="#513">5.1.3 Always defect strategy</a></h3> | ||
<h3 class="link3"><a href="#514">5.1.4 Tit-for-tat strategy</a></h3> | <h3 class="link3"><a href="#514">5.1.4 Tit-for-tat strategy</a></h3> | ||
| + | <h3 class="link4"><a href="#5141">5.1.4.1 <i>Fim</i>E assay: recombinase that inverts fim switch in only one way</a></h3> | ||
| + | <h3 class="link"><a href="#6">6. Dilemma game in general public</a></h3> | ||
| + | <h3 class="link"><a href="#7">7. Reference</a></h3> | ||
<br> | <br> | ||
</div> | </div> | ||
Revision as of 00:52, 15 September 2015
Project
contents
1. Introduction?
2．The original Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario in game theory
3. Replication of the payoff matrix using E. coli
3.1 Prisoner coli’s dilemma payoff matrix
3.1.1 Both cooperation leads to low damage
3.1.2 Both defection leads to middle damage
3.1.3 When one is fooled, two types of damage
3.2 Modeling selected a solution for leaky expression problem to satisfy the requirement of the payoff matrix
3.3 Improvementof CmR protein property by addition of ssrA degradation tag
3.4 Succeeded to replicate the payoff matrix through wet lab
4. Prisoner coli decides its option : Cooperate or Defect
4.1 How to decide?
4.2 Decision making coli
5. Iterated game with several strategies
5.1 The four strategies
5.1.1 Random strategy
5.1.2 Always cooperate strategy
5.1.3 Always defect strategy
5.1.4 Tit-for-tat strategy
5.1.4.1 FimE assay: recombinase that inverts fim switch in only one way
6. Dilemma game in general public
7. Reference
1. Introduction