Difference between revisions of "Team:Tokyo Tech/Practices"

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                   <p class="text3">Through execution of the games, we found that the public chose the option, in which we predicted is affected by the stereotype that “GMO is dangerous.” When we compared the options of the participants by each payoff matrix (FigureXA’s XX and XX), despite the fact whether there is a dilemma or not, there were more people choosing the option of not using GMO.
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                   <p class="text3">Through execution of the games, we found that the public chose the option, in which we predicted is affected by the stereotype that “GMO is dangerous.” When we compared the options of the participants by each payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2 ○ and ○ in group 2, Not Use and Not Use in group 4), despite the fact whether there is a dilemma or not, there were more people choosing the option of not using GMO.
 
From this result, there is a possible interpretation that the public has concerns for sustainability, safety, and security of gene modification, which were not shown in the payoff matrix.
 
From this result, there is a possible interpretation that the public has concerns for sustainability, safety, and security of gene modification, which were not shown in the payoff matrix.
 
To precisely examine further on this interpretation, we would like to increase the subjects playing the prisoner’s dilemma game.
 
To precisely examine further on this interpretation, we would like to increase the subjects playing the prisoner’s dilemma game.

Revision as of 13:20, 14 September 2015

Policy&Practices

  
  

0. Medal Criteria

      

We think that the following 3 processes of P&P meets both of the silver and gold medal criteria.

0.1. Design and execution of prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public
       to investigate public concerns to GMO.

By receiving opinions from public, we integrated, into our project, a prisoner’s dilemma game played by the high school and undergraduate students, who are people outside of iGEM, to investigate the stereotype of concerns about gene modification. Since we received opinions from the public who concerned the sustainability, safety, and security of gene modification, we designed and executed the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public.

As shown in Fig. 6-1-1., in total, we have
2 (Condition A) × 2 (Condition B) = 4 types of payoff matrix. In Condition A, there either is a dilemma, or no dilemma. In Condition B, there either is a story about GMO, or is no story about GMO.In the games in which we incorporated the conception of GMO into the story (Group 3 and 4), we wrote the sum of the cost and benefit by using GMO, as the score in each cell. If the games in which there is no dilemma (or in other words the Nash equilibrium matches with the Pareto efficient) (Group 2), are played to simply compete the scores, choosing the bottom right option would be rational.We designed this game, so that when we combine this same payoff matrix with the story of GMO, using GMO will lead to high scores.

 

Fig. 6-1-1. Our payoff matrix

Through execution of the games, we found that the public chose the option, in which we predicted is affected by the stereotype that “GMO is dangerous.” When we compared the options of the participants by each payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2 ○ and ○ in group 2, Not Use and Not Use in group 4), despite the fact whether there is a dilemma or not, there were more people choosing the option of not using GMO. From this result, there is a possible interpretation that the public has concerns for sustainability, safety, and security of gene modification, which were not shown in the payoff matrix. To precisely examine further on this interpretation, we would like to increase the subjects playing the prisoner’s dilemma game.

Fig. 6-1-2. Our payoff matrix


0.2. Reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits led to addressing
       social justice.

      

In the game played among high school students and undergraduate students, who are all people outside of iGEM, we identified an example where the player himself realized the irrationality of choosing the options adhered to the stereotype of the term GMO. So we temporarily thought of asserting that “each individual’s constant thinking of whether the payoff matrix is correct or not, will lead to the increase of the score for the entire society”. However, from our full year experience in iGEM, we realized the necessity of verifying from a different point of view. In other words, we realized that we researchers ourselves must also continuously reflect on the costs, benefits, and risks of the science we discover (Graph X). In the workshop that we attended as our initial activity in iGEM, we learned from social scientists, the danger of grounding on the deficit model, which fixes on the idea that the general public is ignorant, and the importance of the two-way dialogue between society and researchers. From this past experience, we realized that it wasn’t the participants of the dilemma game who were misinterpreting the payoff matrix from the stereotype of the term GMO, but it might have been the members of iGEM Tokyo Tech who were misinterpreting both the costs and benefits of GMO.The value of our payoff matrix in the dilemma game was indeed designed from assumptions for both the costs and benefits of GMO. Now we address that in order to understand the correct payoff matrix of technology, instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by specialists, one-sidedly to the general public, the posture of cooperating and thinking together with the general public, is important in social justice.Through these process written above, we think that we have already met the silver and gold medal criteria, since we have demonstrated an innovative human practice involving public engagement, by establishing a two-way dialogue.


0.3. Our attractive project improved in accordance with comments from general public,
       can strengthen the public engagement of a two-way dialogue between our team and
       the public

Comments from the general public, who are beyond the bench, modified the design and execution of our project, which is the E. coli version of the prisoner’s dilemma, and made the project more attractive for the general public. We have thought that the establishment of a two-way dialogue is important for synthetic biology to be understood from general public, and is important to avoid any prejudice against synthetic biology. In a school festival, thus we explained our projects to attract the public’s interest, and successfully received valuable comments for improving our project. The most important comment led to the introduction of random decision making by E. coli itself, since we had originally planned to express choices of options made by humans, in each prisoner E. coli. Since then, we adopted FimB recombinase for such E. coli decision making. Another integration for the project’s execution to attract public interest, was the introduction of option selecting strategies by the prisoners. We were excited by identifying a famous strategy in the series of games played beyond the bench by the public, and were sure that the introduction of such strategies would make the game more attractive. We thus implemented the tit-for-tat strategy by adopting FimE recombinase into the design of our decision making E. coli. Now we are confident that our E. coli version of the prisoners’ dilemma game is important to strengthen a two-way dialogue to a wide range of public. Even if we try to establish a two-way dialogue, the general public’s apathy towards synthetic biology would make it impossible for us to start a two-way dialogue.


1. Introduction

      

ここにコピペ。

3. Results

      

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4. Discussion

      

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5. Materials and Methods

5.1. Construction

-Strain

      

All the samples were DH5alpha strain.

-Plasmids

      

Device 1: J23101 + I13504(pSB1C3)

Fig.3-7-4-1.


5.2. Assay Protocol

5.2.1. Protocol1

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6.. Reference

      

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