Contents

0. Medal Criteria

0.1. Design and execution of the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public
       as a means to investigate public concerns surrounding GMO.

0.2. Reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits led to addressing social justice.

0.3. Our attractive project improved in accordance with comments from general public,
        strengthened the public engagement of a two-way dialogue between our team and the public

1. Introduction

2. Dilemma Game

3. Result 1

4. Conclusion 1

5. Result 2

5.1 Modeling

6. Result 2

7. Consideration

0. Medal Criteria

0.1. Design and execution of the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public
       as a means to investigate public concerns surrounding GMO.

By receiving opinions from the public, we integrated, into our project, a prisoner’s dilemma game played by the high school and undergraduate students, who are people outside of iGEM, to investigate the stereotype about recombinant DNA technology. Since we received opinions from the public who concerned the sustainability, safety, and security of gene modification, we designed and executed the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the public.
As shown in Fig. 6-1-0-1, in total, we have 2 (Condition A) × 2 (Condition B) = 4 types of payoff matrix. In Condition A, there either is a dilemma, or no dilemma. In Condition B, there either is a story about GMO, or is no story about GMO. In the games in which we incorporated the conception of GMO into the story (Group 3 and 4), we wrote the sum of the cost and benefit by using GMO, as the score in each cell. If the games in which there is no dilemma (or in other words the Nash equilibrium matches with the Pareto efficient) (Group 2), are played to simply compete the scores, choosing the bottom right option would be rational. We designed this game, so that when we combine this same payoff matrix with the story of GMO, using GMO will lead to high scores.
	Fig. 6-1-0-1. Our payoff matrix
Through execution of the games, we found that the public chose the option, in which we predicted is affected by the stereotype that “GMO is dangerous.” When we compared the options of the participants among each payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2 The top left cell, resulting from the option C and C in Group 2, and the top left cell, resulting from the option “not use” and “not use” in Group 4), despite the fact whether there is a dilemma or not, there were more people choosing the option of not using GMO. From this result, there is a possible interpretation that the public has concerns for sustainability, safety, and security of recombinant DNA technology, which were not shown in the payoff matrix. To precisely examine further on this interpretation, we would like to increase the subjects playing the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Fig. 6-1-0-2. The percentange of the number of times paricipants chose each option in each game

0.2. Reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits led to addressing
       social justice.

We realized the importance of reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits, from one of the cases of the prisoner’s dilemma game held among the public. We think that such an original finding is an innovative education to ourselves and meets the criteria of the gold medal.

In the game played among high school students and undergraduate students, who are all people outside of iGEM, we identified an example where the player himself realized the irrationality of choosing the options adhered to the stereotype of the term GMO. So we temporarily thought of asserting that “each individual’s constant thinking of whether the payoff matrix is correct or not, will lead to the increase of the score for the entire society”. However, from our full year experience in iGEM, we realized the necessity of verifying from a different point of view. In other words, we realized that we researchers ourselves must also continuously reflect on the costs, benefits, and risks of the science we discover (Graph X). In the workshop that we attended as our initial activity in iGEM, we learned from social scientists, the danger of grounding on the deficit model, which fixes on the idea that the general public is ignorant, and the importance of the two-way dialogue between society and researchers. From this past experience, we realized that it wasn’t the participants of the dilemma game who were misinterpreting the payoff matrix from the stereotype of the term GMO, but it might have been the members of iGEM Tokyo Tech who were misinterpreting both the costs and benefits of GMO. The value of our payoff matrix in the dilemma game was indeed designed from assumptions for both the costs and benefits of GMO. Now we address that in order to understand the correct payoff matrix of technology, instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by specialists, one-sidedly to the general public, the posture of cooperating and thinking together with the general public, is important in social justice. Through these process written above, we think that we have already met the silver and gold medal criteria, since we have demonstrated an innovative human practice involving public engagement, by establishing a two-way dialogue.

Fig.6-1-0-3.

0.3. Our attractive project improved in accordance with comments from general public,
       strengthened the public engagement of a two-way dialogue between our team and
       the public

Comments from the general public, who are beyond the bench, modified the design and execution of our project, which is the E. coli version of the prisoner’s dilemma, and made the project more attractive for the general public. We have thought that the establishment of a two-way dialogue is important for synthetic biology to be understood from general public, and is important to avoid any prejudice against synthetic biology. In a school festival, thus we explained our projects to attract the public’s interest, and successfully received valuable comments for improving our project. The most important comment led to the introduction of random decision making by E. coli itself, since we had originally planned to express choices of options made by humans, in each prisoner E. coli. Since then, we adopted FimB recombinase for such E. coli decision making. Another integration for the project’s execution to attract public interest, was the introduction of option selecting strategies by the prisoners. We were excited by identifying a famous strategy in the series of games played beyond the bench by the public, and were sure that the introduction of such strategies would make the game more attractive. We thus implemented the tit-for-tat strategy by adopting FimE recombinase into the design of our decision making E. coli. Now we are confident that our E. coli version of the prisoners’ dilemma game is important to strengthen a two-way dialogue to a wide range of public. Even if we try to establish a two-way dialogue, the general public’s apathy towards synthetic biology would make it impossible for us to start a two-way dialogue.

1. Introduction

In our process of having high school students and undergraduate students participate in our prisoner’s dilemma game, we realized the importance of reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits.
When we explained about iGEM and about our project in the school festival, we received from the public skeptical opinions surrounding recombinant DNA technology. Therefore, we decided to investigate and identify the stereotype of concerns about recombinant DNA technology.

2. Dilemma Game

To investigate what kind of stereotypes people in the general public have about recombinant DNA technology, we prepared four types of games, Group 1 ~ Group4.
Group 1 is a simple prisoner’s dilemma game where there is a dilemma.
Group 2 also is a simple prisoner’s dilemma game, but there is no dilemma.
Group 3 has the same payoff matrix as Group 1 so there is a dilemma.
Group 4 has the same payoff matrix as Group 2 so there is no dilemma.
For Group 3 and 4, we incorporated the conception of GMO into the story. The payoff matrix consists of the sum of the costs and benefits resulting from using GMO.

These games were repeated 10 rounds. We had each player choose options to compete the final scores against each other.
We had the participants form a pair of two. Then, we had each pair play one of the four types of games (Group 1 ~ Group 4).

In Group 1 and Group 2 (Fig.6-1-2-1 and Fig.6-1-2-2), after explaining the original story of the prisoner’s dilemma, we had the participants repeat the game 10 rounds to compete against each other by aiming for higher scores. “C” stands for cooperation and “D” stands for defection.
In Group 1’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-1), considering the values of each option, there should be a dilemma between choosing cooperation and choosing defection.
In Group 2’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-2), considering the values of each option, there should not be a dilemma between choosing cooperation and choosing defection, because rationally thinking, choosing defection would lead to higher scores.

Fig.6-1-2-1. The Payoff Matrix of Group 1	Fig.6-1-2-2. The Payoff Matrix of Group 2

In Group 3 and Group 4 (Fig.6-1-2-3 and Fig.6-1-2-4), after explaining the original story of the prisoner’s dilemma, we explained the following story before starting the game.

We then had the participants repeat the game 10 rounds to compete against each other by aiming for higher scores. “not use” stands for not using GMO and “use” stands for using GMO.
Group 3’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-3) has the same value as Group 1 (Fig.6-1-2-1).
Group 4’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-4) has the same value as Group 2 (Fig.6-1-2-2).
In Group 3’s payoff matrix(Fig.6-1-2-3), considering the values of each option, there should be a dilemma between choosing “not use” and choosing “use.”
In Group 4’s payoff matrix (Fig.6-1-2-4), considering the values of each option, there should not be a dilemma between choosing “not use” and choosing “use,” because rationally thinking, choosing “use” would lead to higher scores.

Fig.6-1-2-3. The Payoff Matrix of Group 3	Fig.6-1-2-4. The Payoff Matrix of Group 4

However, in Group 3 and Group 4, we predicted that if there is a stereotype that “GMO is dangerous,” the pair of decisions on the top left(A: “not use,” B: “not use”) will be selected more frequently, compared to Group 1 and Group 2’s pair of decisions on the top left (A: “Cooperation,” B: “Cooperation”).

3. Result 1

Fig.6-1-3-1. The Rate of the Decisions

The results of the games are shown above (Fig.6-1-3-1). These percentages express the total number of times each pair of decisions were made by all the pairs who played each game.

The results were as expected. Comparing Group 2 and Group 4, Group 4 had a higher percentage of the pair of decisions on the top left (A: “not use,” B: “not use”), than Group 2’s pair of decisions on the top left (A: “Cooperation,” B: “Cooperation”).

4. Conclusion 1

From this result, we could interpret that the public has concerns for sustainability, safety, and security of recombinant DNA technology, which were not shown in the payoff matrix.

5. Result 2

From the same game, we obtained results that could be interpreted in an interesting way.

Fig.6-1-5-1. The Result of A Certain of Pair in Group 4

In this game (Fig.6-1-5-1), until the 4th round, Player B chose various options, but from the 4th round and on, Player B chose the option “use,” until the end of the game. From this result, we interpreted that at first, Player B was imagining a payoff matrix like the one in Group 1 (Fig.6-1-3-1) and in Group 3 (Fig.6-1-3-3), where there is a dilemma, and was misled into a dilemma. However, when Player B chose the option “use” in the 4th round, since his score increased more than he expected, he realized that the points were different between the payoff matrix he was imagining in his head, and the payoff matrix in the game he was playing. Therefore from that round on, he chose the option “use.” After these 10 rounds, since the subject realized that he was misinterpreting the payoff matrix in the first half of the game, the total scores between Player A and Player B did not differ so greatly.

5.1 Modeling

Given Result 2, we simulated how the timing of realizing the fact that “the payoff matrix that one was imagining in his/her mind is wrong”, affects the total score. In this model, we used Group 4’s payoff matrix and made both A and B use the random strategy. However, in A’s mind instead of group 4, he/she is imagining Group 3. Since the payoff matrix in his/her mind does not match with the payoff matrix in reality, the increase in score that one is imagining in his mind will not match with the score in reality. When his/her score goes below a certain number than the opponent’s score, he/she will realize that he/she is misinterpreting the payoff matrix.

We called this certain amount the score gap and simulated 2 types of score gap. In one type we set the score gap to -10, so that one realizes the misinterpretation of the payoff matrix quickly, and in the other type we set the score gap to -50, so that it takes time for one to realize the misinterpretation of the payoff matrix. After simulating the 2 types of score gap 20 times each, since the decisions are made randomly by both players, we obtained various result. The following are a few examples from the results.

Fig.6-1-5-2

6. Conclusion 2

From the results of the modeling, we found out that faster realization of the misunderstanding of the payoff matrix, leads to higher total scores.

7. Consideration

From our Policy & Practices, we realized the importance of reflecting on our own conception of risks and benefits, or in other words the payoff matrix, from the prisoner’s dilemma game played by the high school and undergraduate students. Instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by researchers, one-sidedly to the general public, we have established a two-way dialogue by cooperating and thinking together with the general public.

Our team, Tokyo Tech have considered that the payoff matrix of Group 4 was most based on reality from the point of view that GMO is not dangerous. Therefore, in the case like Conclusion2, we defined Group 4 as the real payoff matrix, and interpreted that Group 3 is the payoff matrix one is misinterpreting in his head. However, there is a possibility that this interpretation of ours is wrong.
No one can know the true figure of the payoff matrix that is closest to reality. We as researchers, instead of fixing upon the payoff matrix that already exists, must evaluate the costs, risks and benefits by attempting in a small range where the damage can be limited, and pursue the true figure of the payoff matrix, when an unpredictable accident happens. We researchers must continuously keep reflecting on the payoff matrix, and pursue the one closest to reality. Instead of forcing a concept that is constructed only by specialists, one-sidedly to the general public, the posture of cooperating and thinking together with the general public, is important in social justice. Each individual’s attempt to pursue his/her own payoff matrix is most important.