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Ethics Essay

Introduction

In this essay I will address the question of whether Edinburgh’s drug purity biosensor is morally wrong because it promotes drug use. First, a clarification of the question will be made, in which I will suggest it should be reformulated as asking if the implementation of the biosensor is morally wrong. Next, I will introduce Utilitarianism as the criteria for moral deliberation, subsequently arguing that the biosensor will have positive consequences for certain demographics, and negative consequences for others. However, I will conclude that, relative to the Utilitarian Principle, the implementation of the biosensor is morally good.

Section 1: Utilitarianism as the Moral Standard

When determining the answer to the question ‘is an object x morally wrong because it condones y’, what we are interested in is not whether an object x is bad, for objects in-and-of-themselves are not up for moral evaluation. Rather, what we are asking is whether an action associated with some object x is morally wrong. For example, when someone commits murder with a gun, it is not the gun itself but the act of unjustly shooting it that is considered immoral. For the very same weapon could be used in another situation without moral objection, such as stopping a heinous crime. Thus, when deliberating the moral status of a drug purity biosensor, what we really want to know is whether its implementation in society is morally wrong.

Now that we have reinterpreted the question, we need a criteria for right and wrongness. In normative ethical theory, this criteria is conventionally understood as an action-guiding moral principle; in other words, a principle that can take an action x as an input and judge whether it is right or wrong, and thus, whether it should be performed. Different normative theories take different action-guiding principles as their criteria for morality, and a few of the most common - stated in their most basic forms - include: Deontology, according to which an action is morally wrong if it is not in accordance with a set of rules or laws; Contractualism, according to which an action is wrong if it is reasonably rejected to on the basis of a mutual social agreement; and Utilitarianism, according to which an action is wrong if it causes more societal suffering than well-being (Alexander & Moore, 2015).

There is great debate as to which of these normative theories is the most plausible; however, it is neither the purpose nor within the scope of this essay to facilitate this discussion. Instead, it will suffice to say that there exist complex arguments in favour of each, and that each is as plausible, or implausible, as the next in terms of the likelihood of standing as the objective moral principle. The strategy to be undertaken in this essay, then, is to select one normative theory as the standard by which to judge the implementation of the biosensor, knowing that another standard could be used just as easily.

Utilitarianism will be used as this standard because it is relatively straightforward compared to the other alternatives. In the case of judging the implementation of the biosensor against the utility principle, it is more or less a process of weighing the positive consequences that action has for society against the negative, and this avoids a lengthy and unavoidable discussion about which laws are supreme in the case of Deontology, or what qualifies a reasonable objection in the case of the most popular form of Contractualism. Here is Utilitarianism restated (M&R, 2005:5):

Utility Principle: The fact that an action would promote well-being is a reason to perform the action. The fact that an action would promote suffering is a reason not to perform the action. An action is morally right just in case it promotes at least as great a balance of well-being over suffering as any of the available alternatives; otherwise it is wrong.

Section 2: Separating the Demographics

Taking the implementation of the biosensor as the action, the Utility Principle can render a moral verdict depending on whether it causes more pain than well-being. In order to quantify the positive and negative consequences, it is useful to conceptualise the populace as splitting into four rough categories: (1) those who do not use drugs and have strong dispositions against them, (2) those who use drugs problematically, (3) those who use drugs recreationally and (4) those who do not use drugs but have no strong feelings related to their use. Granting the premise that drug use, as a whole, is detrimental to society’s well-being, and given that the function of our biosensor is to provide an additional amount knowledge the user would not have otherwise (i.e. whether his drugs are contaminated), the question now becomes whether this additional knowledge is enough to realistically spur individuals in one of these four groups to use drugs more frequently.

Our device will probably not have an impact on the first group because these individuals harbour strong convictions against drug use, and these convictions are unlikely due to a lack of knowledge concerning the purity of drugs.The second could certainly be affected by our biosensor, but in a positive way. Indeed, problematic drug users will either not bother with our biosensor because discovering that their drugs are contaminated will make little difference in the final decision of whether to use, or they will use the biosensor, indicating that they have reached a unique stage in terms of recovery - viz. they are not ready to abstain from drug use altogether, but desire to minimise the associated risks.

Unlike the first two groups, the third and fourth groups could use drugs more frequently as a result of the implementation of the biosensor. In the case of recreational drug users, there is no prohibitive barrier - e.g., moral opposition, ingrained societal prejudice, first-hand negative experience, etc. - in place that is enough to deter them from drug use, like there is for the first group. This is similarly true for the fourth group, because, despite not using drugs, they have no strong opposition to their use. For both of these groups, then, the fact that there is an additional measure of safety provided by our biosensor means that it is plausible that some may engage in drug use more frequently.

Still, an important question remains: can Edinburgh’s biosensor be used legally in countries that do not have drug consumption rooms? The answer is certainly yes. Take the United Kingdom as an example. Perhaps the most similar harm reduction measure to consumption rooms currently implemented in the UK are needle exchanges, where medical staff distribute clean injecting equipment to users. However, unlike consumption rooms, users are neither allowed to use or possess drugs while in needle exchanges, as it is a breach of NHS policy. Yet this does not eliminate the possibility that they could be distributed in a similar fashion as needles and be used at an individual's discretion in the privacy of his/her home.

Section 3: Weighing the Consequences

Now that we have established the demographics whose use is likely to be affected by the implementation of our biosensor, we can return to the original question: is the implementation of the biosensor morally wrong because it will cause more drug use? This is somewhat difficult to answer definitively without empirical evidence, but we can at least draw some general conclusions based on the three groups that would be affected by our biosensor. Recall that problematic drug users would plausibly be positively impacted by our biosensor because, if they are using it in the first place, then they are probably trying to minimise the associated risks. This would count in favour of the implementation of the device being morally good.

In the case of recreational drug users, the biosensor could increase the frequency of use, which would count in favour of it being morally wrong. However, knowing that recreational drug users already engage in drug use without the biosensor, it is necessary to also consider the positive effects it may have; namely, reducing the chances of overdose. So, on the one hand, the biosensor has negative consequences for this group because it increases the frequency of use. On the other hand, it has positive effects because it makes this use safer. It is difficult to determine which way the balance tips, and the matter appears ambiguous at best.

Moving onto the third and final group, the implementation of the biosensor could very well have a negative effect. This group contains individuals who do not use drugs at all, though they do not harbour some higher order objection to their use. Arguably, they are better off remaining abstinent from drug use, and so, if the biosensor is enough to push them to engage in this activity, then it has negative consequences for these individuals.

Let us now turn to a final evaluation of, and tentative answer to, the question at hand. Recall that the utility principle states that an action is morally wrong if it promotes more suffering than well-being. So, in the final moral reckoning, we are essentially asking if the implementation of the biosensor will have more positive or negative consequences for society. We reasoned that only three groups would be affected directly by our biosensor. For recreational drug users, the biosensor will have both negative and positive consequences. Without empirical facts to accurately determine the respective quantities of these consequences, it is best to treat the biosensor’s effect on this group as neutral. Thus, we are left with weighing the positive effects the biosensor has for problematic drug users against the negative effects it has for individuals who would be swayed into drug use, in order to determine whether its implementation is morally wrong.

I think that, when considering these two groups, the positive effects outweigh the negative, for several reasons. First, the demographic of people ‘treading the line’ of drug use is surely small. For it is somewhat unbelievable that there exists a large population that has, up until this point, remained abstinent of drug use, only to be swayed by access to additional information regarding the quality of drugs. A more probable scenario is that this is not quite how risk assessment works, and that very few people actually belong to this demographic. Indeed, consider heroin use as an example. Most individuals probably do not engage in this activity because they are afraid of exceptionally pure heroin; rather, we expect them to harbour more pertinent reservations, such as fear of needles, social stigma, etc.

Second, the demographic of problematic drug users who could potentially be helped by this device is undoubtedly large. An overwhelming majority, if not all, of the countries in the world face problematic drug use. Furthermore, in countries that can afford it, there exists considerable infrastructure devoted to reducing the societal harm caused by drug use, including needle exchanges, drug consumption rooms and rehabilitation services. The fact of the matter is that, while certainly there could be individuals whose only barrier to drug use is a lack knowledge of purity, they most likely comprise a small portion of the population compared to problematic drug users. If the biosensor’s implementation is to have a positive effect on these individuals by reducing harm and illness, then its positive consequences outweigh the negative consequences for society. Thus, according to the Utility Principle, the implementation of the biosensor would be morally good.

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Conclusion

In this essay I have argued that, when asking the question of whether the drug purity biosensor is morally wrong because it will cause more drug use, what we are actually asking is if the action of its implementation would cause more drug use. I then reasoned that assigning a moral status to an action requires a criteria of right and wrongness, and selected Utilitarianism as this criteria. Subsequently, I separated society’s population into four rough groups or demographics, arguing some would be affected by the implementation of the biosensor, while others would not. I further postulated that, in the final moral reckoning, it comes down to whether the amount of good the biosensor could do for problematic drug users outweighs the harm it could do for those on the fence about engaging in drug use. I conclude that it does, and thus, according to the Utility Principle, the implementation of the biosensor is morally good.

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